THE NOME NUGGET

Published Monday, Wednesday and Friday by The
NOME PUBLISHING CO.
Nome, Alaska

Telephone: Main 125 P. O. Box 613
$1.50 PER MONTH $16.00 A YEAR

W. A. and EMILY BOUCHER.....Editors

Entered as second class matter October 14, 1943, at the postoffice at Nome, Alaska, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Monday, October 14, 1946

The Nuernberg Verdict Is A Beginning

(The Denver Post)

There was no surprise, only sober satisfaction, in the death sentences awarded the fallen masters of Europe. Nor could pity be felt for these craven and haggard men who once sloshed a continent with the blood of innocents. In their lifetimes they have sought to extinguish the commonest principles of humanity; on the gallows they will be dedicated to a strengthening of those principles.

We have not forgotten Warsaw, Lidice and Belsen—but this riddance aims beyond mere retribution. If it were simple punishment of individuals we sought in the war crimes trial, it could have been had swiftly and with no loss of justice. It would not have required ten months and all the elaborate, full-dress procedure of Nuernberg.

Nuernberg was planned not for us of the generation which brought these monsters to justice; it was planned for history. It was designed as an effort to fix firmly the laws of mankind the criminal nature of planning and waging aggressive war.

It is widely argued that such a principle is not sound —that there is no precedent for holding individuals responsible for the crimes of government; that, indeed, there is no substantial basis in international law for holding aggressive war a crime; that the victor will always judge the vanquished regardless of rights and wrongs (thus the "crime" will be weakness, rather than aggression); that, facing the certainty of punishment if defeated, belligerents will go to any lengths of inhumanity to conquer, etc.

There is a weighty measure of truth to this. As basis for judgment, the tribunal noted that Germany was a signatory of the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928, which promised outlawry of was as an instrument of national policy in the settlement of controversies—but which did not make war a crime. A general body of opinion holds that aggressive war **should be** considered a crime, but this principle is not to be found in any ratified treaty. The Kellogg-Briand treaty itself, it could be pointed out, has been flouted so repeatedly as to have lost its binding power, if it ever had any.

Justice Robert H. Jackson in a foreword to the book, "The Nuernberg Trial and Aggressive War," by Sheldon Glueck, argues that even tho there may be no legal or customary basis for punishing an aggressor, "our own day has its right to institute customs." That is a remarkable departure from our traditional principle of law condemning ex post facto punishments.

Legal arguments on these points may go on and on—but little sympathy will be lost on the convicted Nazis. Their lives and freedom are already forfeit on other counts. The severest penalties are theirs on common criminal grounds and do not depend on the aggressive war indictment. Each of the condemned men—with the exception of Rudolf Hess, who escaped with his miserable life—is convicted either of crimes against humanity or of violations of the laws or customs of war. Almost all, in fact, are convicted of both these charges.

And, even tho there wil be long and learned argument on the legality of the aggressive war convictions, the Nuernberg verdict stands as a starting point for a new conception in the law of nations.

"Planning, preparing, initiating or waging an aggressive war" henceforth is a crime for which a nation and, more important, its individual leaders, may be held answerable. The rulers of the world no longer face only the judgment of the hereatfer.

GHOST ROCKET

Henry Is Persistent

(The Denver Post)

Henry Wallace's game of footie with the Communists is getting more intimate all the time. The former secretary of commerce, although confronted by Bernard Baruch with the error of his views, blindly insists that the United States is responsible for the atomic armaments race which he says is under way.

For the present impasse in atomic control discussions, Wallace flatly blames his own nation. There is nothing new in his argument; it is identical with that expressed by Communists and their fellow travelers throughout the world.

He points to a "school of military thinking . . . which advocates a preventive war on Russia." The implication is that this view, which he rightly calls "immoral and stupid," is widely shared in this country—a wild distortion. It is a charge frequently made by left wing opponents of U. S. defensive policy who apparently would like to see this nation disarmed.

He calls the question of a security council veto on atomic energy matters "completely irrelevant"—but he fails to answer why, if it is indeed "irrelevant," the Russians are so insistent upon its retention.

He argues that the United States must agree to a definite schedule for destroying its atomic bomb stocks and disclosing its atomic "know-how" to other nations, and that failure to do so is the major impediment to international agreement. But the fact is that the U. S. plan clearly envisages such a schedule.

He avers that, in "some respects" the Russian plan for atomic energy control "goes ever further than our own plan and is in agreement with the basic principles of our plan." This is completely false. The Russian plan, fundamentally, rests on a simple agreement to outlaw atomic warfare—without embracing an effective system of controls and penalties.

But strangest of all is the psychology of a man who—having been shown his error, as he was by Bernard Baruch—persists in spreading poisonous perversions of fact, damaging to his nation's interests. When he wrote these things in innocence, they could be called error; when he repeats them, they become lies.

FILIPINOS JOIN IN CELEBRATING V-J DAY ANNIVERSARY

Tens of thousands of Filipinos joined in celebrating the first anniversary of Japan's final surrender on September 2, and paid tribute to the guerrilla warriors—American and Filipino — who fought secretly during more than three years of Japanese occupation of the islands to make possibel their final liberation.

The part played by the guerrilla bands was little known during the war. But the story has since been pieced together and described in an article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica 1946 Book of the Year. Berkeley Read Lewis, author of the Britannica article, and a major in the Ordnance Department of the U. S. Army, obtained his account through interviews with U. S. officers who organized the guerrillas, and through information received from Lt. Col. Robert B. Lapham, who described the guerrilla activity on Luzon.

Before leaving Bataan, according to the Year Book article, General Douglas MacArthur sent out several groups of officers with these instructions — "Disperse, evade the Japanese, and organize guerrilla bands."

"Each unit contained as a nucleus a few specialists with training in communications, engineering and the like," the Britannic Year Book article continued. "The largest group numbered about fifteen."

The men had little time for detailed instructions. They all knew that their primary mission was to obtain intelligence of the enemy's movements and their secondary mission was to harass the enemy until concerted action would be possible with an American invasion of the islands.

The officers assigned to the mission left Bataan a short time before the Japanese came, the Year Book says. They made their way across Manila Bay, to the east and northeast of Luzon. As the enemy consolidated its position by taking over small towns and villages, the American officers spread out "as thinly as possible" to avoid capture.

At this point practically the entire native population was potential guerrilla material, Lewis states. The Filipinos were organized almost automatically. As native units broke up, under Japanese orders, the soldiers hid their arms and ammunition, went home to don civilian clothes, and wait. With the organiaztion of guerrilla bands, the soldiers retrieved their arms and went back to fight again. Because of this there was little shortage of ammunition, according to the Year Book.

Guerrilla units sprang up spontaneously in this manner throughout the island. But, in the beginning, their work was uncoordinated. Intercommunication was their biggest problem. About the only radio equipment available consisted of small receiving sets in native huts. There were almost no dry batteries and vacuum tubes for theee sets. Storage batteries were obtained by salvage or stealing from vehicles, the article says. American officers, numbering about three to every 5,000 Filipinos, relied on native messengers.

Radio contact between MacArthur's headquarters and guerrilla units on the islands of Panay and Mindanao was first established late in 1942, Lewis wrote. Then supplies began to come in by submarine. Toward the end of 1943 a contact party, which had come to Mindanao by submarine, proceeded by sailboat to Samar and then on to Luzon, where at arrived in April 1944. From that date forward all the major guerrilla elements were linked by radio and submarine.

The movements of the Japanese were watched and reported without delay. If a Japanese unit moved from Luzon to Buna, Americans knew about it almost before the movement was completed. The result was that U. S. forces could forecast Japanese plans and so decide their own invasion strategy, the Book of the Year article reports.

After U. S. troops invaded Leyte, warning orders flowed to the guerrillas, assigning missions and planning future operations. During the first phase of the invasion, guerrillas collected information and identified targets for U. S. planes. Combat action was begun by guerrillas the week before the first landings on Luzon, Lewis says. This action was partly re-

(Continued on Page Five)